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Chapter 1 Smith and Hegel: Free Markets
Adam Smith is a founding father of modern economics, arguing that free
markets affirm the independence of each person, unlike alternative economic
systems. Like Hegel, Smith proclaims that free markets affirm the equal dignity
and independence of every individual. In a free-market economy, people can
provide for themselves through their labor. Thus, free markets partially
emancipate society through economic freedom; each person has the agency to
succeed and achieve upward mobility. A person’s private financial standing is
self-determined and unconstrained by an external authority. For these reasons,
supporters of capitalism such as Smith and Hegel embraced a free market
economy. However, the development of free markets has created economies of
scale that function differently than as described by Hegel and Smith. Those who
own the means of production have dominion over the average worker. The owner
of a firm, which is typically a patron or investor, reaps most of the surplus value
created from the labor of others who in return, receive an hourly wage. As a
result, the relationship between producer and laborer creates an insurmountable
wealth gap, allowing a select few corporations to dominate markets. The way
modern free markets operate in practice should raise serious concerns for those
who agree with Smith and Hegel.

1.1 Purpose
This paper will examine the disjuncture between free markets in practice
and Smith’s conception of free markets. I will offer solutions to address the
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discrepancy between free markets in practice and free markets as theorized by
Smith and Hegel. This will require me to identify the virtues of capitalism that
were appealing to Smith and in particular, Hegel who thoroughly outlines the
merits of capitalism. A revised account of free markets should better serve the
fundamental virtues that Smith and Hegel praised while being consistent with
capitalist principles. Hence, I argue that we can empower the labor force through
various methods (e.g., labor laws, unions, and alternative conceptions of
corporations) which will improve the equal standing between the worker and the
producer.
My account of free markets aims to reestablish the equal standing of the
labor force which may seem antithetical to capitalism at first, but I argue that it is
instead conducive to capitalism. Free markets as they currently operate bear
serious costs that are overlooked by how economists have traditionally evaluated
the cost of production. The cost of production has traditionally been narrowly
defined, only accounting for financial expenses directly related to production
inputs such as capital, labor, or raw materials. It does not, however, account for
the cost that does not affect a firm’s profit. These are the costs that workers, for
example, must bear. Workers may be underpaid for strenuous work which reduces
the labor cost for the firm. In turn, firms reduce the cost of production and
increase profit, but the cost of production does not account for the cost that the
workers must bear. The cost of production is often limited to only the expenses
that reduce the profit of a firm which does not accurately reflect the true cost.
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1.2 The Virtues of the Free Market
To begin, we must understand the virtues of capitalism that were
appealing to Smith and Hegel. As previously mentioned, Smith and Hegel
proclaim that free markets are superior to alternative economic systems due to the
emancipatory effects of a free market economy. In a free-market society, people
would be free from aristocratic rule. In The Wealth of Nations, Smith contends
that in a free market society, a person’s socioeconomic standing would no longer
be predetermined by the social hierarchy arranged under feudalism. Society
would no longer be arranged by a feudal caste system in which aristocrats’ rule
over everyone else. A free-market society would instead require that people
interact in market exchanges “on terms of equal authority, esteem, and standing.”1
Prior to free market societies, the proletariat lived in a state of servitude under the
rule and will of the elite. If you were born into the proletariat, you remained in a
life of servitude, bound to the subordination of aristocrats. In contrast, Hegel and
Smith favored capitalism because of its promising features which required the
equal standing of people as participants of a free market economy. A free-market
economy erodes the social hierarchies of aristocratic domination and proletarian
subordination. A free-market economy would yield a new social order that would
no longer prearrange one’s social standing to a fixed position, emancipating
people from the paternalism and rule of aristocrats or elites. Thus, free market
economies bestow a socioeconomic arrangement that is egalitarian according to
Smith.
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Similarly, in The Philosophy of Right, Hegel argues in favor of a free
market economy because of its promise of equal dignity and independence for
each person. In a free market society, people have the autonomy to pursue their
desires and decide for themselves how they wish to make a living. Thus, a market
economy is an outlet in which people are free to express and fulfill their desires
and needs, allowing them to achieve a fulfilling life. People have the agency to
pursue their endeavors through free-market exchanges which in turn enables them
to determine their social standing. Hence, we affirm our independence in two
forms: 1) by establishing and receiving what one expects in return for what we
provide in a market exchange and 2) by determining our social standing as we
participate in the free market.
A market transaction requires that each person considers the interest of the
person as equally important as their own; each person must provide what the other
person expects in exchange. People must engage as equals in a market exchange
since each person must acknowledge and respect the interests and needs of other
people. The failure to engage with others as equals would compromise one’s
ability to complete a market transaction, which in turn shapes one’s own success
and social standing. We can determine our own socioeconomic standing by
successfully completing market exchanges. Thus, free markets provide the
opportunity for self-determination by requiring others to regard our own interests
as equally important and by allowing us to determine our socioeconomic success.
For these reasons, Smith and Hegel believed free markets to be superior to the
alternative economic systems that we have seen prior to capitalism.
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Hegel outlines the alluring features of a free market society more
extensively in Philosophy of Right.1 To succeed in a market economy, we must
interact with others. Market transactions require us to coordinate and collaborate
our desires with the desires of others through labor and consumption. Such
transactions serve as a heuristic for society that cultivates collaboration.
Furthermore, market exchanges would emphasize the importance of a stable civil
bond. For any system of private property and market exchanges, we must assume
that we are all acting in good faith and obliging by the rules of our market
economy. We rely on social institutions to maintain healthy cooperation by
establishing rules within a market economy. Such rules would prohibit us from
violating basic rights such as stealing. Our experience of the free market would
lead us to reject a world in which people have no constraints in pursuing their
interests. Instead, we would learn the value of cooperation within society as
people reach a mutually agreed-upon set of rules for conduct and transactions
between different people or parties. The state would institute an economic
arrangement that promotes the common good. For instance, institutions would
implement legislation and implement support systems that promote the dignity
and equal standing of all people. Social institutions would ensure the opportunity
for self-determination for people by removing the looming threat that others,
motivated by greed, might undermine, or sabotage us.

1

It is not clear if Smith would agree with everything in Philosophy of Right. I am only including the
arguments that I suspect Smith would sympathize with.
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1.3 Hegel’s Capitalism: Theory vs. Practice
Hegel’s account of free markets identifies the features and principles that a
free-market system should serve. Smith seems to agree that such traits, as
described by Hegel, are vital to a free-market society. Hegel’s account, however,
does not accurately depict the reality of modern free markets in the era of
economies of scale and globalization. When a free-market society does not secure
the virtues that Hegel outlines then the free-market economy yields costs that are
overlooked in the expenses of traditional accounting. The free markets of the US
and global economy as they operate today fail to secure many of the virtues that
are essential to capitalism according to Hegel. Social institutions have failed to
secure the principles of self-determination and equal standing. These failures
should be understood as market failures that impose unnecessary costs which
should be accounted for. With the industrialization and globalization of markets,
it is difficult for workers to secure their interest. The laws and institutions that
govern our markets have failed to secure the interests of the workforce. In
practice, free markets create a division of labor in which the working class, those
who do not own the means of production, have limited opportunities for labor
which are typically occupations that are degrading and repress their
independence. To offer a refined account of a free-market society, we need to
understand how free markets are failing to provide the virtues praised by Hegel
and Smith. I will explain how the failure to secure the values central to free
markets should be understood as inefficiencies in our economy which should be
reformed in a revised account of free markets.
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1.4 The Development Free Markets: Competition
To begin, we must consider how contemporary markets function under
competition with the current conditions of legislative oversight and market
arrangements. It is important to note that free-market economies can operate
differently under a different legislative arrangement that alters how industries
function. I will outline the failures of free-market economies as they function
under current conditions and propose changes that could adjust the outcomes of a
free-market for the better.
With that in mind, consider how our livelihood is contingent upon how
well we fare in our occupation against competition within our line of work. Selfpreservation, in a competitive free-market society, requires you to be greedy. To
remain competitive in an industry, producers must maximize productivity and
cost-efficiency. Producers must develop and acquire the means of production in
an industry. Competition in markets will promote industrial innovation to increase
profits, enabling producers to expand their enterprises. The means of production
for large manufacturers will require workers. Thus, the worker serves as the
means of production for producers as they accumulate capital. Workers are
commodified by producers who are primarily concerned with the cost of labor,
managing workers no different than other costs of production. The primary
concern for producers is to remain competitive in a market and thus, profit
maximization will supersede concerns for the worker. For the producer, the
worker is a mere commodity. Workers are nothing more than labor power that is
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needed for manufacturing. In other words, when firms commodify workers, it
means that firms use workers as mere means to an end.
Firms denigrate their workers, disregarding the needs and interests of
their workers. Firms will disregard the burdens that they place on workers when a
firm reduces their cost of production which is typically accomplished by
minimizing labor cost. Industries will maximize the labor value of workers to
increase the labor power that workers provide. To reduce the cost of production,
producers develop methods to decrease the cost of labor which will be detrimental
to workers. For instance, firms will pay the minimum wage even if it does not
adequately compensate for the working conditions that demand intensive labor,
minimize the expenses to improve working conditions, and minimize all liabilities
and benefits that they owe to their workers. Furthermore, producers decrease the
cost of labor, and in turn increase profits, by developing monotonous jobs that do
not require skills or experience such as assembly lines. The development of
industrial unskilled labor allows producers to dispossess the worker from their
product of labor and instead compensate them for only their labor.
The commodification of the worker entails serious costs for the workforce
which are often overlooked when evaluating the success or cost of a market. The
worker serves as the means of production for the capitalist who appropriates the
product of their labor along with any surplus value that the worker produces.
Meanwhile, the worker can only reap the value of his labor power and the
mechanization of production diminishes the value of labor. Given that the
workforce constitutes the majority of people in a free-market society, any
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evaluation of market success that does not take into account the costs borne by the
workforce would be remarkably unsound and inaccurate.
As a result of this asymmetric relationship between worker and producer,
which is particularly prominent in economies of scale, when industries increase
profits, producers accumulate wealth while the laborer earns a sparing wage.
Thus, free markets systematically produce a wealth disparity with the growth of
concentrated wealth. This wealth disparity contributes to establishing a division
between laborer and producer, which corresponds to their social stratification. In
other words, markets reinforce a division of labor that immobilizes the working
class from attaining careers in which they are not subordinates of capitalists and
companies. Under economies of scale, people cannot compete against established
businesses that are bigger. The concurrent conditions of wealth inequalities,
accumulated capital, and a stringent division of labor has shaped the current
arrangement of free-market societies which has stratified people into property
owners and propertyless or in other words, producers and workers.
The development of large enterprises has given employers absolute
authority within the workplace where employees are vulnerable to termination for
incidents not only within the workplace, but as well as beyond the workplace. In
this sense, employers dominate the worker who must work for a living. The
worker does not choose his labor out of passion but out of necessity. Thus,
workers must comply with their employer, who solely determines the kind of
labor that workers must provide and dictates the hours they work, the uniform
they must wear, and the times that they can eat. The worker only feels free outside

10

of their job and thereby, alienated from their individual human nature, their labor,
and their independence.1

1.5 The Failure of Free Markets According to Theory
The free-market conditions that I have outlined starkly contradict the
virtues that Hegel and Smith praised. However, we can alleviate some of these
free-market pathologies to some degree by creating a revised account of a freemarket economy that better serves the underlying principles of capitalism admired
by Hegel and Smith. This account must consider how competition develops the
means of production in such a way that disempowers workers. Producers are
uninhibited and competition forces producers to adapt by any means necessary,
which results in the disempowerment of workers. Moreover, free markets create
immortal companies that extend beyond what any individual would be capable of.
Companies monopolize markets and their means of production because no
individual, or even a small group of people, can compete. The development of
large powerful firms has undermined the equal standing between producer and
worker, making it harder for the workforce to secure their interests.
To accurately evaluate the failures and inefficiencies of our free-market
economy, we must change how we assess the success of free markets by
redefining the cost of production more broadly to capture the costs that are
external to a firm and their profit but penalize other parties such as the workforce.
To address these issues, we must also consider how institutions and laws have
contributed to the development of markets. Corporation laws and market
legislation has given a comparative advantage to producers and investors over the
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workforce. In the same way that legislation has been made to support investors,
legislation can be implemented to support the workforce in securing their
interests.
The rise of globalization has only exacerbated free-market pathologies.
Firms can maneuver their business operations across different countries and
continents. The globalization of markets has created transnational industries that
operate across the globe such as Amazon, creating domains of authority that
exceed any single government institution. Firms like Amazon are subject to state
laws as far as they operate within their given jurisdiction. The defragmentation of
corporate regulations and financial institutions creates an incohesive system of
market oversight. The transnational structure of firms and the inconsistencies in
market regulations between countries, such as labor laws, have diminished the
transparency and accountability of firms. Consequently, multinational firms like
Nike will capitalize on developing countries with premature institutions and
legislation that fail to adequately regulate industries. Thus, companies are entities
with global reach that pursue their corporate interests indefinitely. Transnational
firms employ a vast number of workers across different countries. Amazon is an
example of a global firm operating across transnational markets; they own
software development centers in 25 countries, customer service centers in 10
countries, and warehouses in 23 countries. In total, Amazon employs 1,608,000
full- and part-time employees across the globe.2 The arrangement of modern
corporations like Nike and Amazon creates asymmetric power relationships
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between firms and workers. The rise of transnational markets and firms has been a
major source of free-market pathologies.
Countries face serious challenges in protecting the integrity of its freemarket economy and subsequently its workforce, which has consequences for the
integrity of political discourse and processes. Multinational corporations share
similar interests related to foreign economic policy and will collaborate to
advance such interests.3 In addition, multinational corporations have greater
means to affect politics by leveraging their global reach, size, and leading role in
the national economy.4 Firms engage in political activities such as lobbying and
campaign contributions to influence policies and political leaders. Firms also
influence public discourse by contacting journalists, issuing press releases,
establishing public campaigns, and organizing demonstrations.”5

Chapter 2: Resolving Free Market Failures: A New Account of Ownership and Cost
To address some of the implications of multinational corporations and the
failures of a free-market economy, we can look to Henry Hansmann’s theory of
enterprise ownership. Hansmann lays out a paradigm for the structure of the firm
which construes the firm “as a nexus of contracts.”6 A business, for the most part,
is constantly engaging in transactions with different parties. Firms act on the
behalf of a business as the centralized single party that arranges transactions and
contractual agreements with the different parties involved in the various stages of
a business operation (i.e., buyers, suppliers, and workers). Corporate laws
recognize the firm as the single legal entity that serves as the signatory to
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contracts. As such, firms may enter contractual agreements with vendors for
supplies or services needed to operate their business, arrange employment
contracts with individuals who provide labor services to the firm, reach
agreements with shareholders via investor contracts (e.g., bondholders, banks, and
other suppliers of capital), or reach an agreement with buyers of a firm’s product
via contracts of sale. Each of the parties that transact with a firm—whether it be
the customers, workers, owners of capital, investors, or the managers of a firm—
is considered a patron of the firm. In contrast, the owner of a firm is the party that
has the formal right to control or manage the firm and is entitled to all the residual
profit that a firm yields. Nonetheless, ownership does not have to entail both
formal control and a claim to residual profits although it is common to see that the
management of a firm is also entitled to the profits. As such, ownership should
not be conflated with management since there might be instances where a firm
would benefit if management was a separate group from the recipients of profit.

2.1 Transactions: Market Contracting
In Hansmann’s analysis of the firm’s structure and ownership, he explains
that firms transact with patrons through market contracting. Market contracts are
the agreements of exchange between patrons and the firm. For instance,
employees agree to a transaction with a firm which exchanges wages for labor.
Other patrons such as investors will agree to a transaction—which is different
from the transaction of employees—with a firm that exchanges an investment of
capital in a firm for company stock. When people buy stocks, they invest their
own money in a firm in exchange for a share of the firm which can increase in
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value or provide a dividend, entitling investors to a stake in profit which can
increase with the success of a firm. The transactions in market contracts typically
involve some cost in return for something of value for both the patrons and the
firm. Market contracts for employees might entail the cost of toilsome labor with
a high risk for accidents or injuries for the worker while the firm, on the other
hand, might bear costs to upgrade the workplace with cutting-edge technology to
improve the safety of workers and perhaps provide health insurance to
compensate for the high risk of injury.
2.2 Ownership and the Cost of Market Contracting
Hansmann’s account of the firm takes into account a firm’s market
transaction with separate patrons which, as I mentioned earlier, is usually
overlooked when evaluating the cost of production and subsequently, the success
of a firm. By including the market contracts involved in a firm’s cost of
production, we must adjust how we determine whether a firm is operating
efficiently. According to Hansmann, firms could operate most efficiently by
minimizing the sum of “(1) the costs of market contracting for those classes of
patrons that are not owners and (2) the costs of ownership for the class of patrons
who own the firm.”7 The cost of marketing contracting is not limited to only
monetary expenses, but, according to Hansmann, “costs” should be understood to
include “all interests and values that might be affected by transactions between a
firm and its patrons.”8 This definition of cost would include unjust employer
paternalism, suppression of worker mobility, and worker alienation which are the
failures of the free market that I outlined earlier. Firms could achieve cost
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minimization by implementing the lowest-cost assignment of ownership. The
lowest-cost assignment would mean assigning ownership to the party with the
most severe problems and costs in market contracting.
Suppose that a firm is changing the safety standards of working
conditions, the firm will reach a decision by considering the tradeoff between
higher wages and increased safety which correlates to the change in risks and
working conditions. The firm will certainly have an interest or incentive to select
the conditions of workplace safety which minimize cost for the firm, but this may
very well fail to align with the preferences or needs of the workers. The firm fails
to arrange market exchanges with the least cost for patrons, which include factors
such as workplace safety or wage, quality of product or service, or overpricing of
a product to name a few examples. This conception of cost that Hanmann offers
takes into account the adverse experiences involved in the process of production
such as worker alienation and exploitation.

2.3 The Cost of Market Contracting: Social Cost and Adverse Experiences
Cost, properly understood, would take into consideration a worker’s loss
of agency or in Elizabeth Anderson’s words, “the basic dignity and autonomy” of
workers.9 The loss of dignity and autonomy for employees occurs for a variety of
reasons as briefly outlined earlier. For the purpose of my argument, we are only
concerned with violations of worker dignity and autonomy that are perpetrated by
the firm to secure their interests, particularly on issues where there is a conflict of
interest between the firm and employees or some other contracting party. The
example from the previous paragraph regarding workplace safety conditions
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failing to align with the preferences of employees would be an example of a firm
failing to secure the dignity and autonomy of workers. Workers are subjected to
the degree of risk presupposed by the working conditions which were determined
by the firm. The firm made a decision by selecting the level of workplace safety
that is in the best interest of the firm without the discretion of any employee. The
risk of injury could be much higher than the risk that workers can tolerate, but the
firm might be completely indifferent to the concerns of workers. Firms are instead
free to operate their private enterprise as they wish, allowing employer
paternalism to oversee the workplace.
The primacy of employer paternalism in the workplace allows the firm to
impose policies and conditions in the workplace that employees must accept
without having any input in the decision. There are many similar instances in
which a firm might impose some workplace policy that aligns with the interests of
the firm, but completely disregards the preferences and interests of employees.
Employees might have to tolerate major injustices imposed by authoritarian firms
and in such cases, these workplace transgressions contribute to the aggregate costs
of market contracting.

2.4 Power Imbalance: Employer vs Employees
The subordination of the workforce is a primary cause of many workplace
injustices, particularly in cases where there is no equal standing between
employees and employers. When employer-employee relations are asymmetric
and in favor of the employer, the needs and interests of employees are overlooked
which results in an adverse or unjust experience in the workplace. There are many
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instances in which a worker has limited flexibility to change occupation or
employer; firms will take advantage of a worker’s mobility, or rather their
immobility. Furthermore, employment under a different firm does not guarantee
improved working conditions. In all likelihood, other firms might engage in
similar workplace practices which would not treat workers any better. The
inflexibility or immobility of the worker produces an asymmetry in employee and
employer relations which allow firms to treat workers unjustly. Take for example,
an employee who has worked several years at a firm, the employee has
established their livelihood around their current job. She might have bought a
house near her workplace with a husband who works nearby and children
attending a local school. Furthermore, she has developed skills and knowledge
that pertains only to her job at that particular firm. To make matters worse,
employers might offer a pension for employees of 25 years so changing
employers would mean the loss of a retirement plan. Firms can leverage an
employee’s cost to change jobs by only paying the worker enough for her to not
leave rather than what she truly deserves to be paid. In this scenario, there are
serious costs for employees to exercise employment mobility; these costs for
employment mobility are referred to as “lock-in.”10 Firms, whether intentionally
or inadvertently, benefit from employee lock-in. The problem of lock-in is only
one of the factors that contribute to employer-employee asymmetries which
impose cost on employees or other parties.
There are other factors that contribute to the asymmetry in employeremployee relations, which typically amounts to a loss of self-determination and
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equal standing in dignity for employees. For instance, suppose that a prospective
employee is offered an unappealing gig as an independent contractor that requires
the workers to pay the cost of maintenance out of pocket and does not provide any
health insurance for the dangerous task. The entire industry might offer
employment only as an independent contractor and not as an employee of a firm,
relieving the firm of any responsibilities or accountability that employees would
otherwise have a claim to. In her field of work, there might not be any other job
opportunities that are better so she may have no choice but to accept employment
at a firm as an independent contractor despite the undesirable wage and working
conditions; this has been the case for truck drivers and employees of the Ecommerce industry.

2.5 The Cost of Injustices: Self-Determination and Equal Standing
These principles of self-determination and equal standing, which are the
virtues that Hegel and Smith hailed as central to free markets, must be taken into
consideration in an account of market contracting cost. Otherwise, an account of
cost that is merely a numerical measurement of monetary expenses would
overlook the serious burdens that employees bear through the experience of
workplace injustices. Injustices in the workplace typically occur when firms
violate fundamental principles of labor. The withstanding of such principles such
as self-determination and equal dignity are critical to accurately evaluate the costs
of market contracting.
The injustices in labor—which are attributed to violations of worker
determination and dignity—involved in the production of a firm are included in
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our account of market contracting costs. By taking into consideration corporate
paternalism or worker subordination, particularly in instances in which the worker
is alienated from their labor and workplace, the cost of market contracting is
much greater than an account of cost that considers only the numeric loss of
monetary value. One might argue that we should not consider these injustices as
cost of a transaction because it occurs independent to our interactions or
exchanges, but, as I will explain in the following section, this is incorrect

2.6 The Role of Government: Market Power Imbalances and Injustices
The rise of workplace injustices is not a natural occurrence of free
markets, but rather a consequence of the asymmetries or power imbalances
between employers and employees. Likewise, power imbalances between patrons
are not a natural occurrence in markets that are independent of external factors.
To the contrary, governing institutions and legislation has significantly
contributed to the disempowerment of the labor force and fragmentation of
industries in order to promote internal competition between firms within the same
industry. By increasing competition amongst a workforce, the cost of labor or cost
of contracting is decreased as small firms are each acting in its own interest. Each
firm is only concerned with their own interest which means that they reduce the
cost for services to undercut competitors in their industries so that more
corporations choose to do business with the firms that charge the least. Corporate
laws have been deliberately instituted to serve the interests of larger firms by
reducing the cost of labor or employment. However, the reduction in labor cost
through increased competition also has a significant byproduct effect for the
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workforce of an industry. The ease of entry for certain industries and promotion
of internal competition has resulted in not only the fragmentation of industries,
but also the fragmentation of collective bargaining power for the workforce of
that industry. The competition between the specific interests of each firm
effectively undermines the collective bargaining of that entire workforce.
More will be said about this in the next section which will further examine
in more detail the cost of workplace injustices and paternalism along with the role
that corporate laws have played in creating asymmetric power relations between
the employee and the employer or firm.

2.7 Assigning Ownership: The Case for Patrons
Hansmann’s paradigm of the firm maintains that each party that engages
in a transaction with a firm is equally vital to the firm’s business operation. A firm
depends on the contributions of various parties such as management, investors or
venture capitalists, employees, suppliers, buyers, and external contractors. Each of
these parties, which includes the owner of a firm, are patrons of the firm given
that they supply some input when engaging in a transaction with a firm. In
making such transactions, each patron bears risks of their own when entering a
market contract with a firm. None of the parties, as understood in Hansmann’s
account on the structure of firms, have an exceptional role or function in a firm’s
business operation.
Ownership is typically associated with the party that supplies or invests
capital in a firm and firms have traditionally granted ownership to investors.
However, there is no particular reason to favor any one party to have the
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assignment of ownership. The supply or ownership of capital does not equate to
ownership of the firm in the same manner that the supplier of inputs such as land,
labor, or other goods does not presuppose ownership. Hansmann explains that the
owners of capital have a claim to only property rights, but that does not
necessarily entail contractual rights.11 Ownership of the firm should instead be
understood as “control over an assemblage of contractual rights, none of which
need involve physical assets or other items that we customarily term property
(such as intellectual property or financial claims).”12 Therefore, owning the
capital of a firm does not require ownership. Firms and capital owners could
instead enter a contractual agreement that exchanges temporary property rights or
a loan of capital for a fixed percentage of profits or a lump-sum payment.
Hansmann theory of ownership and firm structure reveals a predisposition
to form investor-owned firms even when alternative structures of the firm are
more apt at managing certain industries. Firms have traditionally given ownership
to investors and venture capitalists while management is often responsible for
overseeing business operations. The disjunction between ownership and
management creates an adversarial dynamic between non investor parties and the
firm. A conflict of interests arises between investors concerned with profit and the
costs associated with all other parties involved in market contracting with the
firm. The management of a firm attempts to please its investors by undercutting
all other parties in hopes to minimize cost and maximize profit. Hansmann’s
paradigm of the corporation can help identify the areas in which a firm might
commit transgressions against parties involved in a firm's operations and thereby,
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create market inefficiencies. However, Hanmann’s account for the cost of market
contracting offers some solutions to address the excessive costs from workplace
injustices and unequal standing between the patrons and the firm by rearranging
the ownership and patrons of a firm. Solutions that restructure the firm, however,
cannot resolve all the cost from the injustices and unequal standing in our market
economy. We must also supplement changes in the management of firms and
legislation to further resolve the failures and costs of our free-market economy.

2.8 Corporate Legislation: LLC and Corporate Support
Economic policies have had a significant role in structuring the market
economy to accommodate investors and investor-owned firms. Hansmann
explains that “tax law, which has been designed principally with the conventional
investor-owned firm in mind, creates systematic biases for and against other
ownership forms.”13 Investors tend to have considerable leverage over firms due
to numerous institutions and policies that have risen “in the United States to
enforce the fiduciary duties of managers toward their shareholders.” 14 Corporate
laws have granted limited liability to shareholders for firms that are registered.
Corporation laws such as the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act (RULPA)
(1995 and 2006) and The Uniform Limited Company Act (ULLCA) (2001)
decree investors with legal claims to limited liabilities, accountability, and
transparency from a firm. For instance, the RULPA stipulates the following:
a limited partner cannot be held liable for the partnership debts even if
the limited partner participates in the management and control of the
limited partnership. General partners under the prior acts were jointly
and severally liable for the debts, liabilities, and obligations of the
partnership. This liability was complete, automatic and formally
inescapable. Under ULPA (2001), however, limited liability limited
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partnership (LLLP) status is expressly available to provide a full
liability shield to all general partners.15
Policies such as RULPA which legally recognize limited liability
corporations (LLCs) have enabled the rise of LLCs which in turn encourages
firms that are investor owned. Limited liability contracts protect investors from
the risks associated with market contracting with a firm which makes investors a
prime candidate for ownership. Investors can enjoy the privilege of limited
liability while counterpart parties such as employees or buyers do not have any
claims to similar policies of security and limited liability.
To clarify, I am not arguing that we should reject or condemn the legal
codification of LLCs which entitle investors to claims of limited liability,
transparency, and accountability. Although the legal protections and claims of
limited liability contracts provide several benefits to not only firms but also
benefits industries altogether, the primary advantage of limited liability contracts
is that they are imperative to the viability of a business operation in particular
industries. In certain high-risk and high-cost industries, firms would avoid such
industries in the absence of limited liability contracts since the opportunity cost
would disincentivize entering those industries. Firms would supersaturate
alternative safer markets while the development in different markets would
remain stagnant. Limited liability contracts are essential for firms to operate in
critical industries which consequently, advances innovation and technology that
could potentially serve as a public good. Notwithstanding, I am instead taking
issue with the incentives of corporate law, such as LLCs, which favor investor-
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owned firms. Such forms of ownership are harmful and counterproductive in
certain industries whereas alternative forms of ownership would structure the firm
to operate most efficiently with all parties. By supporting investor-owned firms
even in instances that might be inappropriate, corporate policies contribute to
market inefficiencies and workplace inequalities that immobilize the average
worker and create insurmountable income gaps, which I will explain in more
detail later.

2.9 The Cost of Ownership
Firms with other forms of ownership would be better suited for instances
in which other parties besides investors might have more costs and trouble in
market contracting with a firm. Firms can assign ownership to different parties
besides investors or owners of capital. By changing which patron is assigned
ownership, the market contracts between firms and patrons would yield a distinct
set of costs and issues for the firm, customers, owners, employees, and any other
patron. Under certain assignments of ownership, the owner of a firm may have
more of an incentive to behave opportunistically with patrons in comparison to
the incentives of another patron that is assigned ownership. As an owner, each
patron would have different incentives and a change in leverage to negotiate the
terms of exchange in the market contracts with other patrons. In many instances,
conflict of interests between owners and patrons results in undesired transactions
that undermine the interest of the patrons. For example, an investor-owned firm
often has incentives to use any leverage when negotiating market contracting with
patrons such as buyers or employees. The contractual agreement will often favor
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investors at the expense of customers or workers. Hence, the assignment of
ownership produces market inefficiencies.

Chapter 3: Externalities of Market Contracting Failures: Amazon Case Study
The failure to minimize the cost of market contracting is significant not
only because it fails to align with the interests of patrons, but more importantly, it
produces inefficiencies for the entire market. Take, for instance, the supply chains
of E-commerce during the pandemic. Supply chains experienced many
disruptions during the pandemic which resulted in delayed deliveries and
shortages in raw materials and goods such as toilet paper, electronics, and other
common items. Many firms, such as Amazon, manufacture goods in foreign
countries to minimize the cost of labor and production. Firms must export these
goods via shipping containers which limits supply chains. There are several stages
in the transportation of overseas goods in which distributors must coordinate,
creating traffic in the supply chain when distributors are unsynchronized. Firms
must transport goods between the manufacturer, cargo ships, ports, freight trucks,
warehouses, and lastly retail delivery services which distribute goods to stores or
people.
Supply chains rely on the collaboration of all parties involved in
transportation and these collaborative agreements are settled in market contracts.
Collaboration can only occur with the success of market contracts between firms
and the patrons of distribution or delivery which requires that they reach an
agreement on the terms of exchange. However, Amazon has struggled to reach a
successful market contract with employees as indicated by the shortage of labor
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that Amazon has experienced, especially during the pandemic. Amazon
warehouses struggled to retain workers, even before the pandemic, due to
inadequate pay and working conditions are physically taxing and demanding. The
annual turnover rate for many Amazon warehouses has exceeded 100% while
some regions even had turnover rates around 150% (e.g., Cuyahoga, Ohio;
Multnomah County, Ore.).16 Supply chains rely in large part on warehouse
workers and delivery drivers, but despite their critical role in supply chains,
workers and drivers have a limited amount of leverage. Amazon’s negligence of
employees and their interests should concern investors as well since the high
turnover rate involves extra cost to train new employees and a large portion of
their employees are inexperienced, so they operate warehouses less efficiently.

3.1 Market Contracting: Costs for Amazon Employees
Amazon has imposed many costs for workers which created a shortage of
warehouse workers. Amazon has employed its own tactics to undermine the
bargaining power and leverage of workers with union-busting crusades. Amazon
is willing to take extreme measures which were demonstrated in 1999 when they
closed a call center in response to the campaign to unionize 400 customer service
employees launched by the Communication Workers of Americas. 17 There is
clear evidence that Amazon employs “intelligence analysts to research labor
organizing threats against the company” which was made public in a previous job
listing posted by Amazon which has now been removed.18
Warehouse workers and delivery drivers have had virtually no leverage or
input for negotiating the terms of exchange for labor with Amazon. Workers are
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subjected to the paternalism of Amazon. Automated systems organize and
distribute packages to workers for processing and loading which are deliberately
set to a fast speed so that employees work at an intense pace for their entire shift.
Amazon also intentionally sets unattainable productivity quotas for workers so
that they’re pressured to work at their best pace.19 As a result of the intense
expectations and fast pace, one study found that Amazon warehouse workers
“suffered serious injuries at twice the rate of rival companies in 2021.”20 Workers
are closely monitored and reprimanded for not working at a fast enough pace.
There is also little job security for workers since Amazon relies on seasonal
workers year-round. While the wage and bargaining power of Amazon workers
remain relatively stagnant, work conditions

have worsened with the

implementation of technology and automated warehouses.
The working conditions without compensatory wages for Amazon workers
is a prime example of excessive costs in market contracting for employee patrons.
The owners of the firms use their leverage with employees to negotiate
employment contracts which reduces the cost of production for the firm by
placing the burden of cost on workers. The failure to reach a market contract that
satisfies the needs of warehouse workers has also led to a low retention rate.
Workers do not feel properly compensated in market contracts with Amazon. The
benefits and wages that workers receive in exchange for their labor do not
counterbalance the strenuous labor and working conditions. For the worker,
market contracts have more costs than value. The shortage of Amazon warehouse
workers and drivers demonstrates how inefficiencies for the entire market arise
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when market contracts fail to minimize costs for different patrons. The shortage
of warehouse workers and high turnover rate contributed to the disruptions and
delays in supply chains which also negatively impacted customers.

3.2 Externalities of Legislation: Amazon Unions and Anti-Union Laws
Labor and employment laws have had a significant role in hindering the
collective bargaining of Amazon’s workforce. Campaigns to unionize Amazon
workers have met considerable resistance from legislative barriers. In particular,
there are two primary laws that have undermined Unions. The Labor Management
Relations Act of 1987 (LMRA)—also known as the Taft-Hartley Act—was the
initial federal legislation that disarmed unions, creating a path for future
legislation. Unions will oftentimes negotiate for union security agreements which
“is an agreement between a labor union and an employer that the employer will
require all employees to undertake a specified level of support for the union as a
condition of employment.”21 In other words, workers had to pay union fees and
support union efforts even if they were not members of the union. The mandatory
support for unions compelled workers to join the union. In addition, it was
common practice for union security agreements to require a “closed shop” which
is an agreement that employers could only hire workers that would be members of
the union.
LMRA was significant because it prohibited a “closed shop.” This meant
that employers could hire workers who did not want to join the union, allowing
for dissent from unions. The federal prohibition of closed shops under the LMRA
set a precedent for future legislation. The LMRA was eventually followed by the
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National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) which was another federal legislation that
went a step further than the LMRA. Another common tactic of unions is to
engage in secondary boycotts, which are “boycotting actions taken against an
organization or company that does business with another organization with whom
the primary dispute exists.”22 Secondary boycotts are an effective bargaining tool
for unions in negotiations. However, the NLRA prohibited unions and workers
from participating in secondary boycotts. With the enactment of the NLRA,
legislation disarmed unions from another tactic yet again.
The passage of LMRA and NLRA provided states with leeway to enact
laws that extend upon the LMRA and NLRA. States were able to enact right-towork (RTW) laws since it is now in accordance with the federal law under the
LMRA and NLRA. RTW has been enacted in 28 states and has had the most
severe consequences for unions in comparison to the original federal acts. The
implications of RTW can be understood by the following definition of RTW
policy:
Right-to-work is a policy that allows dissenting union members to
not pay non-political dues, or agency fees, to unions. Because of
the exclusivity provision in the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA), unions must still represent these dissenting members
when negotiating the collective bargaining agreement or when the
member is in an arbitration proceeding. The NLRA permits states
to have right-to-work laws.23
RTW has posed the most trouble for unions in their effort to organize the
collective bargaining of the workforce when negotiating with a firm. In most of
the literature on RTW, there is a common sentiment that the purpose of RTW was
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“to make unions more insecure—to slow down or halt the rate at which unions are
organized, and to destroy existing unions.”24 RTW disrupted unions by
dismantling their bargaining tactics to negotiate with a firm. In RTW states,
unions can no longer require mandatory union membership and more importantly,
unions could no longer require nonunion workers to pay union dues. However,
despite the divergence of nonunion workers, unions could not exclude any worker
from the benefits of collective bargaining in negotiations.25 Thus, RTW prohibits
union security agreements altogether, neutralizing one of the major tactics that
unions regularly rely upon.
Firms could fragment their unionized workforce by hiring workers that
were not in solidarity with the union and forgo paying union fees. RTW made
union fees an unnecessary cost. Workers would still benefit from unions
regardless of whether they paid their union fees since nonunion workers could not
be excluded from the worker collective that unions represent. Thus, there is no
longer an incentive for workers to pay a union fee and no motive to act in
solidarity with a union since workers would benefit regardless. To some extent,
there was a disincentive to participate in a union since union fees would be only
an expense with no consequences if workers did not pay it. Workers might also
save themself from the trouble of acting in solidarity with unions since there
would be no consequences and workers would still benefit from the success of a
union. Workers could opt out of participating in their union if they were to
organize labor strikes or other disruptive tactics which would mean that workers
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might not get paid during a labor strike or workers might receive backlash from
employers.

3.3 Inconsistent Legislative Support: Power Imbalances within Amazon
In the case of Amazon, labor, and employment laws such as the LMRA,
NMRA, and RTW have benefitted the union-busting campaign of Amazon while
encumbering the efforts of Amazon workers to unionize. In contrast, corporation
laws such as the RULPA, ULLCA, and ULPA have supported the owners and
investors of Amazon and their interests. The disparities in legislation for labor and
investments are largely responsible—or at the very least complicit—for the
disparities between the workers and investors or owners of Amazon. Corporate
laws have provided limited liability contracts which has facilitated the vast
expansion of Amazon. At the same time, labor and employment laws like RTW
have made it difficult for workers to organize and secure their interest in labor
negotiations with Amazon.
One might argue, however, that my account of unfair legislation is
incorrect since there are federal labor laws that secure employee rights and their
rights to organize. According to this argument, the federal protection of employee
rights supports the workforce and protects their efforts to unionize. The National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA) claims to secure the rights of employees which
includes the right to self-organize. The NLRA prohibits the discrimination of
unfair labor practices against workers attempting to organize for a union and thus,
laws protect workers from employer retaliation.26 If an employer violates a
worker’s rights, the worker can file a complaint with their regional National
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Labor Relations Board (NLRB) which, if proven, will charge employers with
violating federal law. In theory, laws grant employees the right to organize and
unionize while prohibiting firms from discriminating. In practice, however,
enforcing the protection of employee rights is ineffective and the consequences of
violating such rights do not deter employers from engaging in illegal unionbusting tactics. For all the cases of unfair labor practices that the NLRB
investigated in 2016 and 2017, 41.5% of those cases were found guilty and
charged with violating federal law.27 The high rate of conviction does not imply
that the enforcement to protect employee rights has been successful. The high
conviction rate instead indicates that many employers are willing to violate the
rights of workers regardless of the consequences. The consequences for a
violation would “include the issuance of an order directing an employer to cease
and desist from conduct found to be unlawful and an order directing that an
employer post a notice informing employees of their rights under the NLRA.”28
From the perspective of a firm, these consequences are a small price to pay to
disrupt efforts to unionize. Furthermore, employers have a lot of power to prevent
unionization and can exploit legislative loopholes to partake in union-busting
tactics.
The failures of labor laws to secure employee rights have posed significant
challenges for Amazon workers in their efforts to unionize. Corporate laws and
labor laws have clearly had negative effects for the parties or patrons that
exchange with a firm, particularly for groups with much less influence in
comparison to the firm. Legislation, whether it is due to the failures or successes
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of different legislative acts, has had a significant role in creating severe power
imbalances between employees and employers. Although the failures of
legislation may be disheartening, there is optimism in the fact that legislation has
been consequential in shaping our current free-market economy. Legislation has
altered the arrangement of our free-market society which has produced the power
imbalances that currently exist. Hence, there is promise that legislation can also
alter the arrangement of free markets for the better.

Chapter 4: Legislative Solutions for Corporate Reform in Amazon
In the same fashion that legislation has shaped our free-market economy
for the worst in some respects, we can implement new legislation to reform
markets so that it resolves the power imbalances between employers and
employees. Laws could reestablish the equal standing between people by
supporting different patrons so they can negotiate with firms on equal grounds.
Improvements in legislation would alleviate some of the injustices that occur in
the workplace. Legislation would be an effective tool to minimize the costs of
production that disproportionately burden patrons like employees.
There are many strategies that could be implemented via laws. For
instance, an obvious start might be to reform labor laws regarding employee
rights, but there is potential for much more. Laws could be designed and
implemented to incentivize alternative arrangements of the firm which assigns
ownership to other patrons besides investors similar to how limited liability
contracts incentivize investor ownership. A comprehensive scheme of laws could
incentivize the formation of firms that have the lowest-cost assignment of
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ownership for specific industries while disincentivizing firms with costly
assignments of ownership for firms in industries that might have significant cost
and consequences. Furthermore, the role of collective bargaining is insignificant
in our current free-market system. Without larger institutional changes such as
adopting the German system of rules, changes in ownership would do little to
reform firms such as Amazon, let-alone markets in general.
Incentives to alter ownership without any other changes in legislations and
regulations would not solve the excessive cost of a market or firm. In the case of
Amazon, additional government regulation and legislation would be needed to
protect the various classes of firm patrons, especially for workers. Regulations
would be more effective at mitigating the market failures and costs of Amazon
than changes in a firm’s ownership. It would be inexpensive for regulatory
institutions to collect and process the information from Amazon that is needed to
implement a first-best outcome.29 It would be cheap in the case for Amazon
because the information needed to regulate an industry or firm would be mostly
centralized under Amazon. When the relevant information is centralized,
government regulations might be better at mitigating market cost than adjustments
in ownership. When information is decentralized, adjustments in ownership might
be the better option to mitigate market costs and failures since it would be too
costly for regulatory institutions to collect the necessary information. Thus,
government regulation and legislation should be the focal point for reforming
Amazon to minimize the externalities imposed on patrons.

35

4.1 Unions: Mitigating Externalities
Legislation that increases support for unions would also help resolve
injustices that employees experience working for Amazon. The unionization of
Amazon workers could help secure increased wages, better working conditions,
and more non-wage benefits. Take for example, the implementation of automated
machinery, which is usually the newest technology of its kind, in warehouses.
Technology and automation should improve the safety of employees since they do
not have to do the work that automated machinery can complete. This was not the
case for Amazon. Instead, the implementation of automated warehouses increased
the injury rate of workers. The reason for this increase in injuries is that Amazon
implemented technology not because of concerns for worker safety, but for their
concern in increased productivity. Therefore, Amazon used automated machinery
to also increase the productivity of workers, making the job more physically
taxing. A union for amazon workers would bargain for increased workplace safety
which might mean slowing down automated machinery. Unions would organize
the collective bargaining power of Amazon workers to negotiate for reasonable
terms of exchange. A union would force Amazon to take the concerns and
interests of workers seriously which would require Amazon to act upon the
demands of workers such as a healthier workplace culture, increased wage, better
benefits, or whatever it may be. However, unionization would require union law
reforms that change legislation to support worker rights to self-organize and
unions in general while repealing anti-union laws such as RTW. To simply put it,
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Unions would assert the preferences of workers in the decisions and practices of a
firm by using collective bargaining power to negotiate with a firm.

4.2 Codetermination
While unions provide one mechanism to improve relations between the
firm and the workers, there are different strategies or proposals that could also
rectify the market failures of workplace injustices from the unequal standing
between different groups of market participants (e.g., labor force, producer,
investors, etc.)
German codetermination is one of the most promising changes that could
be made in legislation to regulate how Amazon operates along with other firms
across different industries. Corporate laws would need to replicate some version
of the German model of corporate governance, even if it applies only to specific
industries, which entails the following conditions:
Under the German corporate governance system of
codetermination, employees are legally allocated control rights
over corporate assets through seats on the supervisory board —
that is, the board of nonexecutive directors. The supervisory board
oversees the management board — the board of executive directors
— approves or rejects its decisions, and appoints its members and
sets their salaries.30
Codetermination would give considerable control rights to workers.
Workers could elect up to half the members of a supervisory board which would
result in decisions that are more worker oriented. The presence of worker
representatives would also alter the decisions of a supervisory board. In addition,
the supervisory board would appoint members to the management board which
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determines the “strategic direction of the firm.”31 Both the supervisory and
management board would be better aligned with employee interests. Employee
representatives would prevent boards from making decisions with only the
objective of investors in mind. Codetermination would also require firms to
“dedicate a management board position to labor affairs.”32 This position would
create another avenue to include workers and their concerns in the management of
a firm. Codetermination seems to be the proposal that would most effectively
resolve worker alienation and unequal standing between employees and
employers. However, codetermination alone would not result in significant
reformation that resolves the many market failures that currently exist under
contemporary legislation. Hansmann explains that codetermination is successful
in Germany because of their legislative system and scheme of laws that has been
designed to facilitate cooperation between different groups of market participants
such as employees and employers. Thus, codetermination in the U.S. would need
additional support from a robust system of laws in labor, employment practices,
and corporations.
For the purpose of this discussion, let us suppose that adequate legislation
is in place. If Amazon adopted German codetermination, it is likely that there
would be a higher level of satisfaction amongst workers which would increase the
retention rate of workers. Amazon could have avoided or, at the very least,
mitigated some of its failures in employee market contracting which was, and still
is, a serious issue during the pandemic. Amazon’s failure with employee market
contracts has resulted in a shortage of labor in their warehouses. By allowing for
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more employee input and expanding their control rights within Amazon boards,
Amazon management would give more weight to the preferences of workers in
decision making or when putting forth some plan of action. With greater
considerations for workers, Amazon would make different decisions that improve
the working conditions and treatment of workers, increasing the retention of
workers. Furthermore, the supervisory and management board could no longer be
negligent of the externalities that workers experience if the boards were to attempt
making a decision that caters to investors or customers as they typically would.
Both boards will have to regard the concerns of employees with greater
importance, if not as equally important as the concerns of investors, customers, or
other patrons. Thus, codetermination would reestablish the equal standing of
Amazon workers and disrupt employer paternalism. The increased influence of
workers would prevent injustices in the workplace which minimizes the cost of
employee market contracting.

4.3 Constraining Mechanisms
Aside from unions and codetermination, there are other solutions that
could address the power imbalances and excessive costs between the firm and its
patrons. The firm has different compartments of authority that are responsible for
distinct affairs or proceedings. The affairs of different component in a firm could
be limited by policies. These policies could inspire similar methods that limit
different functions or behaviors of the firm. Restrictions that focus on specific
corporate functions could be implemented via constraining mechanisms, which is
a term coined by Hansmann. Each constraint mechanism can also vary in

39

strictness and in the extent of constraints. Constraint mechanisms could offer
significant changes to the function of a firm that could perhaps prevent workplace
injustices, mitigate some of the market failures of a firm, or reduce unnecessary
social and financial costs of a firm. There are three different categories of
constraining mechanisms which are control rights, fiduciary duties, and scope of
authority. Potential solutions for corporate reform might involve only one
constraining mechanism, some combination of two mechanisms, or a combination
of all three mechanisms. Approaches or solutions that use all three forms of
constraining mechanisms seem to have the most promise for corporate reform, but
there are limitations which will be more obvious as I lay out the specific
applications and conditions of each mechanism. Nonetheless, constraining
mechanisms could alleviate issues like worker alienation or employer paternalism
for plenty of firms across several industries.
Let us first consider constraining mechanisms on control rights. There are
three forms of constraining mechanisms on control rights that could increase the
control rights of workers and each form varies in the degree that workers can
exercise control over the firm. The first method is direct management which
would mean that the workers themselves are the managers of the firm. The second
method is delegated management which would mean that workers have the power
to choose the organization’s managers. The last method is autonomous
management which is seen more often in nonprofit foundations and means that
“control resides entirely in the hands of the firm’s managers, who are themselves
either self-appointing or are selected by third parties.”33 The three methods of
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allocating control rights, and perhaps other alternative versions of the methods,
could offer some improvements in management for certain corporations. The
changes in control rights could potentially have benefits that carry over into other
issues in the firm such as problems of lock-in, alienation, or increased retention of
workers to name a few possibilities.
The second constraining mechanism focuses on fiduciary duties which are
restrictions on management’s ability to engage in self-dealing transactions.34
There are three forms of constraints on fiduciary duties and each form varies in
the extent of restrictions. The strictest form of fiduciary duties prohibits selfdealing transactions by managers unless approved in advance by all beneficiaries
and maintains a non-distribution constraint to controlling persons which prohibits
transactions of buying or selling with the firm. Nonprofit foundations implement
the strictest fiduciary constraints. The second form of fiduciary duties is the
moderate version which prohibits self-dealing transactions unless approved ex
ante by non-conflicted managers or ex post by beneficiaries.35 The third form is a
mild version of fiduciary duties that simply prohibits fraud and is often seen in
limited liability corporations since contracts assert that members have a duty to
act in good faith with fair dealings.36 These restrictions could apply to specific
industries, but in the case of Amazon, constraining mechanisms on fiduciary
duties might not offer much benefit or change to prevent Amazon from behaving
opportunistically towards its patrons.
The final constraining mechanism focuses on the scope of authority
delegated to the managers of an organization. Hansmann explains that the scope
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of authority “reflects the degree of latitude or discretion given the firm’s
managers in determining what the organization will do and how it will be done.”37
All else held equal, any increase in authority will give managers more opportunity
to engage in actions contrary to the interests of the firm's beneficiaries and
patrons. There are three levels of this mechanism. The first form of this
mechanism has the most extreme limitations, and it requires a firm’s managers to
be tightly constrained by the organization’s governing instruments, which specify
appropriate managerial action for most circumstances. The second level, which I
will refer to as moderate authority constraints, is less extreme than the first and it
establishes a firm’s governing instruments that ensures the firm is operating in
accordance with the firm’s intended general purpose, but managers are given the
discretion to determine how those purposes are to be achieved. The last form of
this mechanism gives managers extensive discretion to determine the purposes to
be served by the organization and the means of achieving those purposes.
We could implement all three mechanisms by using legislation to
incentivize, encourage, or require some form of each constraining mechanism.
The healthcare industry would be a good candidate for legislation to use
incentives and other forms of legal pressure to encourage certain corporate
practices and policies while disincentivizing and discouraging unwanted corporate
behavior. Legislation Constraining mechanisms on fiduciary duties would be
appropriate, if not called for, in health care industries. It is a frequent practice for
investor-owned firms in the pharmaceutical industry to prey on the desperation of
buyers who need life-saving medication or treatment by hiking the prices of such
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products. Restrictions on fiduciary duties would prevent firms from selling
lifesaving medical treatment to maximize profit. Profit maximization in healthcare
creates reprehensible costs for the purchasers, exploiting their medical needs that
require treatment regardless of the price. Furthermore, if only nonprofit
organizations were to operate the healthcare industry, healthcare would be
managed more efficiently than it would under investor-owned firms. Nonprofits
would provide medical products at the appropriate price since nonprofits would
not be concerned with the return on investment. Constraining mechanisms on
fiduciary duties provides similar outcomes by limiting how firms function so that
it prevents the firm from behaving opportunistically and for its own gain. Thus,
the healthcare industry could be substantively reformed if legislation encouraged
nonprofits to enter the market and all other firms to adopt some level of
constraining mechanism on fiduciary duties. All three levels of this mechanism
can be implemented so it would still allow for investor-owned firms in healthcare
but would considerably reduce market failures by reducing unnecessary cost.

4.4 Constraining Mechanisms: Success and Failures of Different Strategies
The use of a constraining mechanism in other large enterprises like
Amazon would not have the same success as it might in healthcare. Several forms
of all three mechanisms would be ineffective or not viable. For instance,
delegated management is one of the constraining mechanisms in control rights
that would be feasible in Amazon. However, even if delegated management were
to be implemented in Amazon, merely having an elected representative or even a
couple elected representatives as board members would only be capable of
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amending a few issues. It would not be logistically feasible for a few board
members that are removed from the Amazon operations occurring in several cities
across several states to significantly alter the working conditions of the half
millions of workers in different departments. And board members would not be
familiar with the needs and concerns of workers that would be specific to each
department, region or state, and other factors. Moderate constraining mechanisms
on the scope of authority would be the only other corporate change that would be
viable for Amazon. However, this mechanism would also face serious challenges.
The challenges for constraining mechanisms in Amazon do not mean we
should be pessimistic or that such mechanisms are useless. I will offer an analogy
that might provide clarity for the utility of constraining mechanisms which could
also apply to other strategies that are successful in some firms or industries but
fail in other cases. Constraining mechanism provides a toolkit that is equipped to
repair several kinds of malfunctions like loose screws in a cabinet or replacing the
wheels to skateboard, but I would not be able to repair a car with only a toolkit; I
could only fix minor issues with my car. Likewise, constraint mechanisms could
effectively resolve issues in other firms and industries, but additional solutions
and changes would be needed for larger market failures that are caused by greater
and more serious problems.
The example of Amazon demonstrates that there are challenges posed by
both overarching failures in regulation by governmental institutions and issues
that are distinct to specific firms or markets. In the case of Amazon, substantial
changes in other areas like unionization or significant changes in legislation
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would be needed to meaningfully resolve Amazon’s market failures. The changes
in legislation would need to enact robust laws that support the workforce while
repealing anti-union laws. Without the changes that I mentioned, workplace
injustices will continue to occur, and the unnecessary cost of workers and other
patrons would not be abated. Like other firms and markets, Amazon will require a
whole array of strategies and efforts if we wish to truly reform the corporation.

4.5 The Cost of Market Contracting: Truck Driver Industry Case Study
The deregulation of the trucking industry, which occurred in the 1980s, is
another interesting case worth examining. The deregulation of the trucker industry
prohibited unionization which has decreased the retention of truck workers.38
There are about three and half million truck drivers in the United States, but ten
million people with commercial driving licenses for trucks which is a high
turnover rate. I will examine the reasons why truckers do not remain in the
industry to hopefully explain the causes for the notable high turnover rate. I will
then discuss the implications of the high turnover rate for companies that contract
drivers, customers, and the market altogether.
Firms, such as freight brokers or E-commerce companies like Amazon,
classify drivers as independent contractors despite oftentimes working exclusively
for such firms. By classifying drivers as independent contractors, firms are not
responsible for benefits, sick-days, leave-time, holiday pay, the cost of
maintenance for trucks (e.g., monthly oil changes, wheel replacements, or
damaged car parts) and the risks of drivers. In addition, firms are exempt from
payroll taxes (Social Security and Medicare), workers compensation, federal and
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state unemployment insurance or benefits, and minimum wage by claiming that
drivers are independent contractors rather than employees.39 The terms and
conditions of labor as a trucker imposes several financial and social costs for the
worker which disincentivizes the occupation.
Despite the many drawbacks and disincentives for truck driving, truckers
have essentially no bargaining power or say to negotiate the rate of pay and terms
of labor. Freight brokers, who are intermediaries between shippers and carriers,
have an advantage in setting the rate of pay which is based on miles driven and
not hours on the job. Truck drivers must settle for the rate of pay that a broker
offers, which only considers the value of labor skills, leaving out of account the
many disincentives of the occupation as a driver. Truckers do not get paid for
having to wait out weather emergencies such as rain or snowstorms and the wait
time for loading and unloading. Furthermore, trucks have electronic monitoring
devices that track the hours driven and stopped to enforce regulations on truck
drivers. Regulations limit truckers to only drive no more than eight consecutive
hours and require drivers to take a ten-hour break which they are not paid for
despite being out on the delivery. The regulations paired with monitoring devices
limit the agency of truck drivers by mandating the time of rest and limiting the
hours allowed to drive. Drivers must stop as required, even if they are perfectly
fine to drive for another hour or more, but truckers are not paid for hours spent on
the road. Prospective drivers often feel that the typical rate of pay does not
compensate for the working conditions, resulting in the high turnover rate in the
trucking industry.
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4.6 Truck Driving as Independent Contractors: Externalities of Market Contract Failures
During the pandemic, supply chains underwent delays due to a scarcity of
truck drivers–along with warehouse workers–which was not from a shortage of
drivers, but because of the low retention rate for drivers. Drivers do not feel that
the wage compensates for the working conditions. The delay in supply chains
demonstrates how market contracting can produce market inefficiencies. The
market contracts for drivers had serious costs that were not compensated in the
rate of pay, creating disruptions in distribution for not only large firms like
Amazon but for all retailers like small companies or self-employed entrepreneurs.
Furthermore, virtually all customers had severe delays in receiving a product. The
delay in deliveries had serious consequences for customers with urgent needs
such as furniture, appliances, gasoline, and diapers—which all had shortages due
to supply chains.
The cost for merchants and customers could have been reduced if truck
drivers and Amazon workers could have negotiated for better benefits, working
conditions, or increased pay. The failure of market contracts to satisfy the
demands of drivers and warehouses resulted in costs for other businesses and
customers who were affected by the delays in supply chains. Amazon workers
must tolerate the strenuous labor in a dead-end job that does not have much to
offer workers. And drivers must work away from their families and home for
extended periods year-round. If market contracts had satisfied the concerns of
drivers and warehouse workers, both industries would have increased the
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retention of drivers, alleviating some of the market inefficiencies in the supply
chain. Businesses could have delivered products to customers more efficiently.

4.7 The Role of Legislation: Truck Driving Industry Case Study
Deregulation has made the trucking industry remarkably fragmented.
Drivers must compete against each other which undermines the bargaining power
of each driver. In 1959, for instance, congress passed section 8(b)(4)A of the Taft
Hartley Act which made the following declaration:
[it is] an unfair labor practice for a union to induce or encourage
individual employees, or to coerce or restrain persons engaged in
commerce, to cease handling or transporting the product of any
other producer [section8(b)(4)(A)], and made it unlawful for
unions and employers to enter into contracts under which the
employer agrees to cease or refrain from handling the product of
any other employer [section 8(e)].40
Corporate laws like the Taft Hartley Act (THA) disarmed trucker unions
from using common tactics that they relied upon which also occurred in the case
of Amazon workers that has ceased unionization so far. THA makes it difficult
for employees to organize for the purpose of collective bargaining. Hence,
government policies have created institutional barriers that make it difficult for a
workforce to secure their common interest.
The Motor Carrier Act (MCA; 1980) is another major shift towards
market deregulation that contributed to the fragmentation of the truck driving
workforce. Like the Taft Hartley Act, MCA made it difficult for truck driving
workforce to secure their interest through collective bargaining. The deregulation
of the trucking industry was mostly in part due to the MCA. It was passed to
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increase competition amongst drivers by making entry easier. The MCA no longer
required drivers to have a specific permit to carry a particular cargo. Instead,
under the MCA, any truck driver, so long as they have a commercial driver’s
license, is allowed to carry any cargo. More people were able to become truck
drivers, most of which were nonunionized. The surge in truck drivers, particularly
those that are independent or work for a small company, meant that many of the
drivers had no information on competing drivers. Truck drivers do not know the
rate of pay and benefits of other truck drivers. Drivers must accept the conditions
and pay in the contracts offered by a shipping firm since another driver might take
the offer otherwise. This allowed shipping firms to determine the rate of pay for
drivers.
Although the MCA was implemented with the intent to increase the size of
the workforce, the truck driving industry still experiences a shortage in drivers. To
the contrary of the MCA’s intended purpose, the deregulation of the trucking
industry created a shortage of drivers. Drivers are unwilling to work under the
current working conditions. Although the MCA reduced shipping costs for
customers, overtime, the primary beneficiaries have been large shipping firms like
Amazon which have cut costs of operation by reducing the labor cost of drivers.

4.8 Trucker Industry: Potential Solutions for the Workforce and Mitigating Externalities
There are several means by which market contracts could have been
improved. This section will consider potential solutions that could alleviate some
of the primary concerns for the trucker workforce. To begin, let us first consider
how changes at the corporate level could improve the situation between drivers
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and shipping firms like Amazon that contract drivers. E-commerce or shipping
firms could settle on a rate of pay for freelance drivers and small trucking
companies that includes performance bonus clauses in market contracts which
stipulate a monetary incentive in exchange for completing an indicium of
productivity (e.g., miles traveled or value of total deliveries).41 However, there are
serious challenges for truck drivers which are similar to the circumstances of
Amazon workers. Corporate laws are largely responsible for making it difficult
for workers to cooperate together for collective bargaining power.
Similar to the legislative changes that I suggest for Amazon, significant
improvements can be made for the workforce by making adjustments to the
current laws that govern markets and industries. For instance, as I mentioned
earlier, the MCA was deliberately implemented to fragment the truck driving
industry, making the entry of the profession easier for independent drivers and
welcoming new drivers to join the profession of truck driving. It is important to
note that the MCA did have some benefits for our markets and supply changes by
removing government redlines that prohibited drivers from carrying different
cargo without the appropriate permit. The removal of required permit restrictions
meant a removal of constraints for drivers, increasing their agency to determine
which cargo they will load and carry. In addition, the MCA eased entry into the
trucker workforce. A proposal to improve the conditions of the workforces should
be designed to preserve the benefits of the MCA. The concern to preserve benefits
of the MCA means that a solution should avoid interfering with the workforce via
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regulations or other paternalistic policies that complicate a worker’s ability to
carry out their job.

4.9 Unique Challenges of Trucker Industry: Fragmentation and Decentralization
Many of the traditional legislative proposals and other strategies to reform
employer-employee relations cannot be applied in the truck driving industry. The
reason that typical policies could not work in the trucking industry is because the
workforce of drivers is composed mostly by independent contractors, small startup companies that are self-employed, and many other fragmented truckers. For
instance, unionization is virtually infeasible for truck drivers because of how
thoroughly fragmented the trucking industry is, which makes collective
bargaining nearly impossible since drivers are extremely decentralized. To put it
in perspective, the top ten shipping carriers, which would include Amazon,
represent 85% of shipping capacity while the top ten trucking companies only
account for 12%. Thus, the trucking industry can serve as an example on how to
rectify the market failures and their excessive costs that burden people who do not
work for a traditional corporation. Solutions to rectify such failures and costs
would need to address the power imbalances between large firms and small
independent contractors so that truckers are no longer subject to the will of larger
corporations which ignores the preferences and concerns of truckers. The example
of truckers might offer insight on how to improve the equal standing and
opportunity of self-determination for people outside of traditional corporations.
A large portion of the potential solutions to improve the conditions of the
trucking industry will rely on innovative policy. Policies like the MCA have been
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responsible for the fragmentation of the trucking industry which now works
against the interests of drivers. And as a result, the fragmentation has contributed
to shortage of labor in the trucking industry. Thus, if policies have fragmented the
industry, then policies can also consolidate the industry, which is one potential to
restore their collective bargaining power.

4.10 Alternative Solutions: Mergers, Tax Incentives, Changes in Labor Laws
The potential solutions that could amend trucker workforce would all
require the implementation of legislation that is designed to support drivers and
encourage behaviors within the trucker industry. For instance, the government
could offer tax credits and subsidies for the expenses of a trucking company that
would be used for the cost of maintenance and other expenses of drivers. Tax
credits and subsidies would increase with the more drivers that work for a
company. Mergers would slowly defragment parts of the trucking industry,
making it easier for the workforce—and especially for consolidated trucking
companies—to secure their interest. If policies were to make mergers easier and
incentivized, the collaboration of small firms or independent contractors would
restore some of the collective bargaining power of workers. However, tax
incentives could have unfair consequences for self-employed drivers and small
businesses.
A less problematic solution would be to require employers to pay truckers
for a certain number of hours when they are not driving. The Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA) and hours-of-service law limits the hours that truckers can drive and
requires breaks of around 10 hours at the minimum. Employers pay truckers by
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miles driven so all the extra hours that a trucker is not driving goes unpaid. Thus,
a required minimum hourly wage would prevent employers from minimizing the
pay of drivers which would improve the working conditions of truckers.

Chapter 5: Conclusion
The case of the truck driving industry demonstrates how large firms still
benefit from the power imbalances with other patrons even if they are not direct
employees of the firm. Corporations are in a position to determine the terms of
exchange which is used to minimize their cost by imposing it on patrons. Under
our current system labor and employment laws along with corporate laws, patrons
have reduced agency in transactions with larger companies which makes patrons
vulnerable to the will or paternalism of companies. The average employee has
even less agency than other patrons when transacting with a firm which makes the
largest group of our economy the most vulnerable to workplace injustice and
excessive cost when engaging in exchanges with firms. The common argument in
response to any dissatisfaction with a company is that we are free to walk away
from the exchange, but this narrative is misleading because it overlooks the reality
that the reach of large companies encompasses our alternative options and our
day-to-day lives. If we exit a transaction with one firm, we are merely choosing
another firm to impose unjust costs and burdens upon us.
The current conditions for the ordinary worker are antithetical to the
virtues and promises of capitalism that Hegel and Smith proclaimed. The unjust
practices imposed by the conduct of corporations functioning under our current
free-market economy is often explained and rationalized by a myth. This myth
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claims that corporations and our economy function the way they do—which is
unapologetic of the injustices, costs, and deprivation that people experience under
the will of corporations—because that is the reason that companies have survived
and thrived under a free-market economy. However, this myth fails to
contextualize how corporations and our economy have arrived at this point. Upon
closer inspection, the myth fails to consider the significant role of our governing
institutions and legislation in the development of our market economy and its
corporations. Laws and regulations have catered to the development of our
economy by putting corporations at the forefront while failing to protect the equal
standing and secure the opportunity for self-determination of the average person.
In fact, as I pointed out in this essay, our elected officials and governing
institutions have deliberately undermined the stability and prosperity of
employees because they were in industries that would benefit larger corporations.
There are several instances in which our institutions have supported the endeavors
of corporations while neglecting, if not thwarting, the welfare of people through
our employment. This disparity in institutional support has enabled the massive
power imbalance between companies and the individuals that make the
workforce.
As I have outlined in this paper, there are several failures in our current
free-market economy. Our institutions have failed to secure fundamental
principles of capitalism for the ordinary person. Our institutions have not only
failed us, but they have contributed to the conditions in which people are
subjected to the will, injustices, and costs of corporations. However, in this paper,
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I have offered various strategies by which we could reform our free markets so
that it places the worker at the forefront. The strategies that I provide are
categorized into two different forms of proposals: 1) changes in the corporation
and 2) changes in our institution and legislation. Both forms of proposal have the
same purpose in mind. That is, the primary purpose of this paper is to reimagine
not only a free-market economy, but also to reimagine a society that places the
worker at the center of importance. And I remain optimistic that we can alter the
behavior of companies and the function of our free markets to restore the equal
standing of the people that are central to our society under a free market—the
worker.
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